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INTRODUCTION

I
n 1986, tax depreciation and other investment subsidies were reformed with a view to bringing effective and statutory tax rates for assets of different durabilities closer together, or at least as close as feasible given the information available about economic depreciation. After 15 years, both economic conditions and legislative initiatives have changed the depreciation landscape. Several policy issues have been raised about the depreciation system. One such issue, raised by Gravelle (1999) and the recent Treasury (2000) study of depreciation is that real estate investment may be overtaxed. By contrast the argument has also been made that equipment investment, especially high tech equipment investment, should receive more generous depreciation, and an explicit proposal (10-5-3-1) has been made by an industry group to address this issue. In addition, concerns have been raised about the relatively rigid depreciation system that exists today, both because of the limited number of depreciation classes and because Treasury does not have the authority to shift class lives to reflect changes in economic depreciation or assign appropriate lives to new assets.
The first section of this paper assesses the current depreciation system in light of historical depreciation practices, as a way of evaluating whether our current system seems to be operating in a relatively efficient manner and what changes might be needed. The remaining sections discuss each of the concerns about the system: the potential over-taxation of real estate assets, the current rigidities in the system, and arguments for more generous equipment depreciation.
HOW DOES THE CURRENT SYSTEM FARE: ASSUMING CONSTANT ECONOMIC DEPRECIATION
The current depreciation system is still relatively even-handed 15 years after the passage of 1986 Tax Reform Act, at least by historical standards. Tables 1 and 2 show the effective tax rates of assets of different durabilities (arrayed from least to most durable), using constant measures of estimated economic depreciation from Hulten and Wykoff (1981) . The effective tax rate is the share of the internal rate of return that is taxed, and depends on the statutory tax rates, the depreciation rules, and any investment subsidies (see the appendix for further discussion). Table 1 shows how uneven the taxation of different assets was in most of the years preceding the 1986 act (see appendix for assumptions regarding inflation and discount rates). In understanding how the taxation of different assets changed over time, there are two important effects of tax and economic policy that are uneven across assets with different durabilities. First, investment credits favor short lived assets, although in general that favoritism was limited by rules that reduced investment credits when tax 51  47  57  57  55  52  -68  53  49  46  46  46   24  30  36  39  29   37   39  32  38  34   35  30   45   41  31  27   30  26  39  44  38  35  -50  50  47  39  44  44   13  4  23  26  18   24   27  19  27  21   25  19   39   34  20  15   19  14  31  38  31  28  -42  48  44  36  42  42   31  45  44  47  36   46   47  40  46  43   42  37   48   44  40  36   38  34  44  46  43  41  -41  47  44  39  41  42   19  13  31  34  25   32   35  26  35  28   32  26   45   41  26  21   25  19  37  44  37  34  -71  52  48  40  45  45   40  55  53  57  46   55   56  49  55  52   51  46   56   53  48  44   46  42  52  53  51  48  -48  57  53  44  49  50   24  21  21  30  16   28   31  22  31  24   29  22   41   37  22  17   22  16  34  41  35  44  -34  55  52  34  49  42   19  -8  7  18  5   17   22  6  22  13   23  13   33   25  12  5   12  4  30  36  32  28  12  57  54  30  51  44   -14  -19  -18  -13  -13   -12   -12  -12  -5  -11 -3 -9
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-9 -8  6  22  -7  16  10  43  40  20  38  38   16  19  18  15  14   14   14  14  18  13   16  11   27   11  11  11   11  10  21  32  9  27  11  42  39  27  37 lives were very short. (This favoritism can be reduced, but not eliminated, by basis adjustments, which allow depreciation only on net of credit costs.) In addition, investment credits were not applied to buildings, but rather to equipment and structures classified as equipment for tax purposes. (Public utility structures as classified in the national income accounts are treated as equipment for credit purposes). Secondly, inflation tends to penalize short lived assets somewhat more than it does long lived ones. The latter effect has been considered somewhat counterintuitive, but both can be understood when one considers that for a given stock of assets, any penalties or subsidies are repeated more often the less durable the assets. Prior to the adoption of investment credits, shorter lived assets tended to be taxed more heavily than longer lived ones, although tax rates fell for both with the accelerated methods adopted in 1954.
During the sixties and seventies both shorter tax lives and investment credits reduced tax rates for equipment assets (the credit was suspended between 1966-67 and repealed in 1969-70; the credit rates were boosted in 1975), despite the growing inflation rates in the late sixties and seventies. Statutory tax rates fell very little, from 52 percent to 46 percent. In 1981, tax lives for equipment and structures were drastically shortened, and the combination of the credit and these shorter lives actually transformed the tax system from one with taxes on equipment to one with subsidies. These generous depreciation rules were to be phased in and were suspended before the highly negative rates occurred, but depreciation on the eve of tax reform remained characterized by extremely low rates (approaching zero) for equipment and positive rates for structures, at least based on estimates of economic depreciation available at that time. The 1986 revision broadened the base of taxes, by repealing the investment credit and increasing tax lives, especially for structures. The revision lowered the statutory rate to 35 percent These revisions created a more uniform tax burden both between structures and equipment and across different durabilities within each broad type. The effective tax rates are shown in column (2) of Table 2 , assuming a 5 percent real discount rate and a 5 percent inflation rate.
While significant strides were made in achieving a more neutral depreciation system, the 1986 changes were also characterized by the development of "backstops" to the current system, chiefly in the form of the alternative minimum tax (AMT), which applied when the tax burden under the regular tax fell below the burden that would apply under the restrictions on deducting losses for passive investments, which included certain real estate assets. In 1997, however, the tax lives for normal and AMT depreciation were conformed, making the AMT less likely to apply.
At the simplest level, both legislative changes and changes in macroeconomic conditions have undone some of the neutrality gains that were achieved in the 1986 Act, although the system has withstood attempts to provide substantial benefits for short-lived equipment assets. Initial attempts in the Clinton administration to adopt an incremental investment tax credit for equipment failed and the "Neutral Cost Recovery System" in the Contract with America proposed by the incoming Republican congressional majority in 1995 was dropped from the package.
Nevertheless, changes did shift the balance back to favor equipment. The 1993 tax revisions increased the corporate tax rate by a percentage point, a neutral change. However, these revisions also lengthened tax lives for structures from 31.5 years to 39 years, a change largely understood to reflect a revenue trade off for the relaxation of certain passive investment provisions rather than reflecting a reconsideration of economic life. A fall in inflation (new calculations are performed with a 2 percent inflation rate), which lowered tax rates, caused tax burdens for short-lived assets to decline relative to long-lived ones. Overall, tax rates on equipment (the top 22 categories) fell from 32 percent to 27 percent. (Residential structures were taxed at slightly lower rates than nonresidential structures, assuming similar depreciation rates, because their slightly shorter (27.5 year) lives were not increased.)
MORE GENEROUS DEPRECIATION FOR STRUCTURES (OR LESS GENEROUS FOR EQUIPMENT)?
The estimates in the previous section indicate that equipment tends to be favored relative to structures. Gravelle's (1999) analysis also suggests that equipment is favored (and that possibly the estimates in Hulten and Wykoff (1981) are too small). The issue of heavier tax rates on structures is also raised in the Treasury report. Gravelle also reports tax rates on equipment and structures looking at particular types of buildings (e.g., factory, office building ) as shown in Table 3 .
These tax rates are similar to those based on new estimates of economic depreciation prepared by Deloitte and Touche (2000) , which found lower depreciation rates for industrial structures, higher rates on other structures and also considerably higher rates for a new category, retail structures. Table 4 reports the effective tax rates using these depreciation rates.
If effective tax rates on structures were to be brought into line with those on equipment, one could either raise the tax burden on equipment by lengthening lives or lower the tax rate on structures by shortening lives. For example, using the economic depreciation numbers in Table 2 , if the seven year life that is most typical for equipment were increased by one year-to eight years-and all other lives subject to the same percentage increase, the tax burden would rise by 2 percentage points, from 27 to 29 percent. If the life were increased by two years, to nine years, the tax burden would rise to 31 percent; if the life were increased by three years, to ten years, the tax burden would rise to 33 percent; if the life were increased by four years to 11 years, the burden would rise to 35 percent.
Because of the smaller present values and depreciation methods, it would take a much larger absolute change to lower the tax burden on structures to 27 percent. In the case of office buildings and apartments (using estimates in Table 3 ), a life of 20 years would be required. In the case of factory buildings, a life of 17 years would be required.
Changes in effective tax rates could also be achieved by changing the method. For example, substituting double declining balance methods for straight-line would cause effective tax rates on factory buildings to fall from 38 to 34 percent, on office buildings to fall from 35 to 31 percent, and on apartments to fall from 31 to 28 percent . This change would bring apartment tax rates in line with equipment, but not accomplish the full effect for other structures. If all structures were given a tax life of 27.5 years (with double declining balance methods), tax burdens on office buildings would fall to 28 percent, and tax burdens on factories to 30 percent. To further lower the tax burdens to 27 percent for factories, not only would double declining balance be needed but the recovery period would need to be shortened to about 21 years; the recovery period for apartments and office buildings would need to be about 26 years.
In addition to these general estimates of tax lives, arguments have been made that improvements to real property are written off over too long a period, since they receive the same write-off period as original structures. The combination of all assets into a single class was designed to avoid the problems of component depreciations. In the past, it has been alleged that buildings were split into many components with only the structural shell written off over the regular period that was meant as an average, and with other components written off over shorter periNote: Economic depreciation is based on Hulten and Wykoff (1981) estimates; apartment buildings are assumed to have the same economic depreciation rate as office buildings (2.47% using a geometric rate). Factory buildings are assumed to have a 3.61 % geometric depreciation rate. The average depreciation rate (weighted by capital stock shares) for equipment is 15%. ods. There are several options: (1) keep the current rules, (2) assign components, including original construction components, separate lives that are set to equal economic depreciation on the composite, and (3) provide a composite depreciation for a building, but allow component depreciation for future modifications.
CLASSIFICATION RULES AND CONSTRAINTS
Another potentially important limitation of the current depreciation system is the rigidity of the system, which arises from two reasons: the decision to use only a limited number of classes, and the removal of the authority of the Treasury to assign class lives in 1988. Having a limited number of classes means that, even if assets can be properly assigned to their classes, there will be differences in effective tax rates. As an illustration, consider the first, second, third, and fifth assets in Table 2 , which are assigned to the five year class. Since they are short-lived assets, that grouping is reasonable. However, the effective tax rates range from 35 to 24 percent. The majority of assets fall into the seven year class which results in a tax rate as high as 29 percent for mining equipment, but as low as 21 percent for agricultural equipment. More class lives would permit a more uniform set of tax rates. Nor is it likely that adding more classes would add much in the way of complication, since the challenge is how to assign assets, rather than how to calculate depreciation (which is relatively straightforward). At least one reason for retaining the limited number of classes in 1986 might have been a desire not to depart too dramatically from the existing 10-5-3 set of classes for equipment, by simply adding three more categories (7, 15, 20) . There is no obvious reason, however, for not refining the system by adding more classes.
A second potential problem is the loss of flexibility in the system since the Treasury, with legislation passed in 1988, no longer has the authority to reclassify assets. That problem, and others, including lack of research on depreciable lives, led Neubig and Rhody (2000) to argue that the current system is flawed, especially in creating high tax rates for technologically advanced equipment. In particular, they suggest five types of misclassification problems: new assets may be put incorrectly into existing classes, they may be assigned the default class of seven years, they may have changed in a technological sense, they may be assigned incorrect lives because they are classified by industry, and they may be assigned different classes for different taxpayers.
One approach obviously would be to provide Treasury with the authority to reallocate asset. However, Neubig and Rhody (2000) argue that few studies of depreciation have taken place by the government, and this was true when Treasury had the authority to re-assign and develop new classes. (Of course, without the authority to assign, there seems little reason for the Treasury to spend its resources on such studies). Neubig and Rhody suggest that industries could undertake such studies, with Treasury review.
Government authorities might well be suspicious of depreciation studies carried out by or financed by the industry, and industry may well be suspicious of depreciation studies carried out by the government. At the same time, to allow depreciation policy to depend on academic research that is motivated by scholarly interest rather than the need to monitor a depreciation system, which has been largely the case in the past, has its flaws as well. (Scholarly interest, of course, arises not just due to the need to set taxes, but to properly carry out national income accounting). Clearly, to refine depreciation policy would require some rethinking of the institutional arrangements and it is possible that industry financed studies with careful Treasury oversight would be the best approach.
To what extent the issue of "high-tech" assets is of a major concern, we defer to the next section, which discusses the arguments for faster depreciation for equipment, and also raises some issues for estimating economic depreciation.
MORE GENEROUS DEPRECIATION FOR EQUIPMENT?
A persistent theme in the formulation of depreciation policy in the last 40 years, to which the 1986 act was an exception, has been the favorable treatment of equipment investment. Investment credits were only allowed for equipment and the proposals by the incoming Clinton administration were no exception. Extra-accelerated depreciation in the Neutral Cost Recovery System was also restricted to equipment. As shown above, there is a slight tilt towards equipment now based on the Hulten and Wykoff (1981) depreciation estimates and the argument for more generous equipment depreciation is not consistent with those observations. However, parts of the current argument appear to reflect, particularly, the notion that equipment assets purchased today are more "high-tech," and shorter lived, than those in the past and hence estimates using constant depreciation rates could be incorrect.
Recently, there has been a proposal to allow much more rapid depreciation methods for equipment, referred to as 10-5-3-1. This proposal would allow businesses to write-off high-tech equipment over one year. Remaining assets would also have their lives shortened, and, as a general rule, those that are now classified as ten-and seven-year property would be written off over five years and present five-year property would be written off over three years (although these changes are not a fixed rule, as the proposal reclassifies some assets). A separate proposal has been introduced in Congress to allow for the expensing of high-tech equipment. Table 5 calculates the effective tax rates that would apply considering only the shortening of existing assets with a rough attempt to implement this proposal for normal (non-high-tech) assets. Ranges are given because of uncertainty in the assignment of assets with a lower (A) measure and a higher (B) measure. Effective tax rates for high-tech assets would be close to zero. This approach would greatly magnify the differences between equipment assets. Just considering the tax rates on "normal investments," the equipment tax rate would fall from 27 percent to between 21 and 24 percent. Expensing or one-year depreciation on high tech equipment would bring the rate even lower.
Clearly this shift would not be justified by the standard analysis of effective tax rates. Are there reasons that efforts should be devoted to lowering tax burdens on equipment rather than on structures? Several arguments have been advanced in the past and are being advanced currently. We consider them in turn. And of course another reason for the focus on equipment may be that businesses that tend to buy equipment are more organized and more effective at lobbying than businesses that tend to buy buildings.
Equipment is Productive
The simplest argument, and one that has been around for some time, is that equipment is somehow "productive" and needs to be encouraged while structures are not. This view is contrary to economic analysis where profit maximization should drive the allocation of investment (absent market failures) to its most productive uses. And while there are assuredly many market failures, this view is not really based on identifying them as leading to an under-investment in equipment. How did such a perception become so firmly ensconced in the popular debate? There are a number of possible reasons. One is the notion that if technological advance is embodied in equipment productivity will increase if more of such investment is made. But this reasoning is faulty economic reasoning: the most productive investment is that which is chosen in a competitive market, and older equipment should only be replaced when the gain from doing so is worthwhile. Another reason might be a fascination with technology or perhaps a reflection of the era of aggressive tax shelters in real estate and stories of "see-through" buildings (although these occurred long after the investment credits of the sixties) which identified buildings, the remaining important business capital asset, as "unproductive."
Buildings are Really Favored Because of Debt and Other Tax Differentials
Another argument that has persisted for some time is that buildings are really favored over structures because they are more heavily debt financed. Such an argument was made by Gordon, Hines, and Summers (1987) . Of course, differentiating depreciation rates between assets as a way to offset the relative benefits of debt finance is a second best solution in any case. More importantly, however, the claim simply is not true. There is no evidence that buildings have higher debt to asset ratios that the corporate sector in general. Gravelle (1999) for large rental properties the ratios were virtually identical. It seems doubtful that this relationship has reversed, since the corporate ratio has now climbed to nearly 50 percent. She speculates that the perception in the academic literature that the real estate sector was so heavily leveraged may arise from a debt to asset ratio of 80 percent reported by Fullerton and Gordon (1983) which was based on Compustat data and probably represented the highly leveraged real estate development business rather than lessors of real estate.
Similarly, the argument was that made that buildings are favored because of churning, although even before the 1986 act, that argument depended on the general use of installment sales, which was not supported by the data.
The popular perception that buildings are favored may also reflect the role of the assets in the tax shelter business, which gained rapidly in popularity in the late seventies and early eighties. But the role of buildings in the tax shelter business may have largely reflected the constraints placed on equipment leasing, which left real estate as the most important asset for this purpose (although oil and gas shelters had a role large relative to their importance in the economy as well). Of course, current law and economic conditions constrain shelters in many other ways (e.g., leveraging with the borrower in a high tax rate and the lender in a law is most beneficial at high inflation rates).
There are perhaps other ways in which buildings are favored. For example, the corporate sector, which is taxed more heavily than the non-corporate sector, is less structures intensive than the noncorporate sector, and one might argue that buildings should be given slower depreciation rates to compensate. Of course, the same arguments would also apply to agricultural equipment and assets. As in the case of debt finance, however, such a tax differential is a second-best approach. And there is a compelling counter-argument: buildings are subject to higher state and local property taxes than are other business assets.
Thus, the arguments that buildings should be taxed more heavily because they are favored by other aspects on the tax law are based on faulty data, represent second best solutions, or ignore offsetting tax penalties.
Equipment Investment Creates Positive Externalities
There is no apparent reason or strong evidence that an investment in equipment creates externalities. De Long and Summers (1991) provided some cross-country evidence that investment in equipment was positively correlated with economic growth, but this evidence was not robust to changes in sample and specification (Auerbach, Hasset, and Oliner, 1994) ; the results depend very much on a few outlying observations.
Without empirical evidence, it is only possible to speculate on the matter. High tech equipment might, in some cases, lead to increased worker skills that cannot be captured by the current employer. Such externalities, however, are likely to be narrowly focused and may be less important than the neighborhood externalities of buildings (i.e., attractive buildings and properties that are new or are maintained and provide pleasure to the onlookers and enhance the value of adjacent properties). We are in very unchartered waters if we formulate tax policy on speculations, rather than evidence, of external effects.
Current Tax Lives are Too Long for Equipment Because of Technological Advance
This argument seems the potentially most legitimate one, and while it does not explain the historical preference for favoring equipment, it would make a case, if true, for adjusting current tax lives.
Estimates of economic depreciation for equipment are even more difficult to make than estimates of economic depreciation for structures, because equipment is not sold as frequently (and some is unlikely to be sold at all). As a result, few studies exist (compared to a much more extensive literature on structures). Many of the depreciation rates in the Hulten and Wykoff (1981) data are not directly estimated, but are simply estimated based on a typical relationship between useful life (which has been estimated for more assets) and the economic depreciation rates. And, there are numerous technical challenges in estimating economic depreciation (as outlined in the Treasury (2000) study and in Gravelle (1999) ). Hulten and Wykoff (1996) updated and refined their estimates. While they found most of the economic depreciation rates to be quite similar, they did increase the rate for electrical equipment from 00.11 to 0.18. As a result, the tax rates would rise for these types of assets (electrical transmission equipment, communications equipment, and other electrical equipment) by about 5 percentage points. A few other tax rates would rise and fall by about a percentage point, but on the whole the overall effective tax rate was about the same (28 percent rather than 27 percent). These results do make a case for more generous depreciations of these assets. Oliner's (1996) study of metal working machinery, which did account for a later time period, however, found a lower rate of 0.095 for metal working machinery, resulting in a tax rate of 21 percent for that asset. Hulten and Wykoff's alternative estimates for non-residential structures were about the same as before, 3 percent, which would produce a tax rate of 36 percent.
Fraumeni (1997) reports on the economic depreciation rates used in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), which relies heavily on the Hulten and Wykoff (1981) numbers, but includes updated estimates where available. Whelan (2000) also reports some of this data. The effective tax rates using the original Hulten and Wykoff numbers and the NIPA numbers are reported in Table  6 ; these numbers typically suggest somewhat lower effective tax rates, and, in a few cases, some significant changes. Overall, however, effective tax rates for equipment are slightly lower, at 25 percent, than those based on the original Hulten and Wykoff numbers alone.
The NIPA depreciation rates, and the estimated tax rates derived from those estimates, do not suggest an upward surge in tax rates for equipment in general. However, these rates, while including some updated estimates, nevertheless rely heavily on older data and on imputed depreciation rates. The argument that has been made is that recent technological change has made these older estimates of useful lives and economic depreciation obsolete. Critics often use examples, such as retiring personal computers within a couple of years, even though they are depreciated over five years. While economists may be concerned in general about how well the tax depreciation periods match the economic depreciation, much of the popular concern involves claims that high-tech equipment should be written off very quickly.
There are three reasons that, from an efficiency standpoint, such concerns are not wholly justified and that a wholesale, or even a targeted, reduction in equipment lives would almost certainly cost more in efficiency losses than it gains for the short lived assets that ignite the concern in the first place.
The first is that the fast pace of technical change may not continue, and, indeed, is not likely to continue indefinitely, and this circumstance creates tremendous problems for estimating depreciation. While computers and computer components have been involved in an era of rapid development, with great gains in speed and storage capacity, such gains may not persist. Once declining limits to these gains or diminishing productivity returns to these gains occur, the useful life will expand and economic depreciation will be more heavily influenced by physical depreciation than by obsolescence. The most common method of estimating depreciation, by observing used asset prices, only works well for new assets if the pace of innovation has stabilized, or become small relative to physical costs. Added to lags to allow for the gathering and analyzing of data, any estimates from recent data may be wrong, and indeed may be more in error than the older data for assets that served similar functions.
A concrete example of this point may be made with computer prices. Quality adjusted computer prices, as reported in the NIPA, fell by an average annual rate of 11.5 percent over the past 19 years, but by only 10.4 percent in the past nine years, and 2.6 percent in the past four years. Moreover, the earlier reductions occurred with higher inflation rates and were thus larger in real terms. To the extent that these prices are a proxy for the gains in productivity of different vintages of computers, it is clear that the pace has slowed. Estimates of depreciation that are based on these rapid falls in asset prices could be in error in connection with new assets.
Secondly, if assets really have finite, and short, lives they have an automatic protection from being overtaxed. For example, suppose an asset lasts for two years and then disappears in value entirely (it acts as a one-hoss shay, with a fixed amount of output). Simply calculating the effective tax rate using the full five-or seven-year write-off would result in an effective tax rate of 47 percent and 61 percent, respectively. However, when an asset is discarded, then the entire remaining undepreciated cost can then be deducted. In that case, the effective tax rate for the five-year life would be 39 percent and for the seven-year life 43 percent. Thirdly, if assets do have very short useful lives, that is, if they depreciate very rapidly, they are likely to be less sensitive to slower write-offs because the rate of return is less important to the economic cost of using these assets. In order to test the magnitude of this issue, consider a very simple model of the economy as a single firm, with a Cobb-Douglas production function and four kinds of capital, with depreciation rates of 0.5, 0.33, 0.15, and 0.03. These rates represent two versions of short lived assets, an asset with the average useful life for equipment and an asset with the typical depreciation rate of a building.
The production function is:
where Q is output, K i is capital stock of type i and L is labor. The first order conditions of this function, assuming a fixed total capital stock, are:
where r is the pre-tax rate of return, d i is the economic depreciation rate, and a i is the exponent in the production function. Assume that the amount each type of capital, as well as labor, is equal to one. Table   7 provides the deadweight loss, or efficiency cost (reduced output) divided by the increased revenue for an increase in the tax rate from 35 percent to 40 percent for each type of capital stock in turn. This measure allows a way of comparing the effects across assets.
These calculations illustrate the dramatic differences across asset types. For the shortest lived asset, to raise an additional dollar by increasing the tax rate costs the economy one half of 1 percent of the revenue in lost output. In the case of the longest lived asset, that additional dollar of revenue comes with a loss of almost 5 percent of the additional receipts in lost output. These results are not surprising, since most of the annual cost of using long-lived assets is the foregone interest on funds, while most of the annual cost of using short-lived assets is loss of the original investment as the asset ages. For example, when the tax rate was raised on the shortest lived asset (with depreciation rate of 0.5), the stock of that asset fell by 0.9 percent, and the other assets' stocks (from shortest to longest lived) rose by 0.1 percent, 0.2 percent and 0.5 percent. When the tax rate was increased on the longest lived asset, with a depreciation rate of 0.03, the stock of that asset fell by 2.6 percent, and the other assets' stocks (from shortest to longest lived) rose by 0.5 percent, 0.7 percent, and 1.3 percent.
CONCLUSION
This analysis has suggested a number of potential changes that might improve the depreciation system. Clearly, the sys- Assumes pre-tax rate of return, r, is 7% and total capital income share is 0.40, i.e., the a's sum to 0.4.
tem should be monitored and attempts made to update economic depreciation estimates, which may only succeed if Treasury is given the authority to make classification changes. Failing that, some sort of institutional arrangements should be made to insure research on depreciation continues. Revisions to the basic system, such as expanding the number of equipment classes and considering component depreciation, may have merit.
The central issue remains, however: should we focus on benefits for structures, or benefits for equipment? All of the reasons given in the previous section: the likely transitory nature of extremely rapid obsolescence in any one category of assets, the built-in protection from depreciation errors for assets with finite, short lives, and the likelihood that taxes on the return to capital will cause very small efficiency losses for short-lived assets, suggest that a focus on short-lived, "high-tech" assets may be misdirected. Rather, the more important issue should be greater efforts to achieve correct depreciation for long lived assets. There is, as noted earlier, good reason to believe that the largest existing distortion in the tax system is the extremely long lives and slow methods of depreciation for buildings, particularly non-residential buildings. Having said that, however, it is nevertheless true that the system as it exists still gets high marks for neutrality compared to most of the history of the depreciation system between World War II and the 1986 revision.
The discussion of technology also suggests that studies based on used asset prices during periods of technological advance that have since slowed (in the rate of technological advance) will provide a poor guide to depreciation lives. Given the lags to obtain a range of used asset prices and time for researching the study, a finding that prior assets had a very rapid depreciation rate will overstate the case for new assets. In this case, newer studies may actually be inferior to older ones if the older studies more accurately depict the physical wearing out of the asset. These observations suggest that new techniques to study rapidly evolving technologies may be needed that will be forward-looking. Such studies might involve adjusting past estimates by forecasts of future relative price changes. In any case, it may be premature to assign extremely short lives to high tech equipment that is physically durable.
vided, depreciation is reduced or partially reduced by the share of the asset financed with the credit (i.e., full basis adjustment means z becomes z (1 -k) ).
For historical depreciation methods and lives, and investment credits, see Gravelle (1994) . This book also provides information on historical inflation and the construction of real discount rates. Each era's effective tax rates were calculated using the average of these values over the period. Table A1 reports the values used for each era. 1953 1954-61 1962-63 1964-66 1966-67 1967-69 1969-70 1971-74 1975-80 1981 1982- 
Appendix: Calculation of Effective Tax Rates
